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Federalisation Versus Centralisation: Tensions 
in Fundamental Rights Discourse in the EU 
ELEANOR SPAVENTA* 
 
I. Introduction 
The debate about fundamental rights in the European Union does not concern so 
much the identification of the values which should be considered at the very heart of 
our conception of humanity. After all, those values were identified in 1950 in the 
European Convention of Human Rights. Rather, the debate revolves around the 
identification of the locus, supranational or domestic, where it is appropriate to carry 
out the balancing exercise between these conflicting values; and also, on the 
identification of the institution, judicial or political, which should carry out such 
balancing exercise. This balancing exercise normally reflects deeply held societal 
preferences as to the respective strengths of the values enshrined in fundamental 
rights documents. In this respect, the Member States’ acceptance to defer the 
balancing exercise, as a last resort, to the European Court of Human Rights was based 
on the assumption that the European Convention of Human Rights would represent a 
floor of rights; such a minimalist conception allowed the balance to oscillate 
considerably between different assessments of the respective force of conflicting 
values. In this way, the Convention, as interpreted by the European Court of Human 
Rights, served the double purpose of respecting the plurality of societal choices that 
characterises different polities, while at the same time enforcing a minimum level of 
protection which itself reacts to changes in social perception. As complex as the 
creation of an international human rights discourse might be, then, it is considerably 
simpler than its supranational counterpart. In the international sphere, there is no 
ambition to harmonise the fundamental rights discourse beyond what is required by 
the minimum floor of protection. In the supranational sphere, on the other hand, and 
as we shall see in more detail below, the emergence of a fundamental rights discourse 
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might require the imposition of a sole standard (sometimes lower and sometimes 
higher than the national counterpart) in the protection of fundamental rights.  
In this sense, the fundamental rights discourse in the European Union reflects the 
evolution of, and the tensions inherent in, the Union’s constitutional process. In 
particular, the debate about fundamental rights protection mirrors the tension between 
federalisation and centralisation, and the deep worries which we have seen expressed 
in relation to the recent constitutional process. At both political and judicial level, 
there are in fact two conflicting forces, centripetal and centrifugal, in relation to 
fundamental rights protection. The centripetal force attracts the fundamental rights 
discourse within the European Union project, first as an ancillary goal and then—
more and more—as an aim in itself.1 The centrifugal force, by contrast, seeks to pull 
away fundamental rights from the EU gravitational orbit.
2
 The centripetal force 
reflects the development of the European Union in a more mature and comprehensive 
constitutional system, a system that has long stepped outside the confines of the 
internal market. The centrifugal force, on the other hand, reflects the desire to 
maintain a diversified and multifaceted constitutional system, where national 
sovereignty is seen as the source of the Union’s own constitutional legitimacy.  
This contribution seeks to explore these dynamics; in particular, it will be argued that 
if the fundamental rights discourse aims to serve a legitimising function, it must 
reflect these tensions and acknowledge that centralisation of fundamental rights is not 
always the answer. We will start by a short historical introduction of the development 
of fundamental rights discourse in the European Union, and then focus on the two 
forces at play, the centralising and the federalising force, in the case law of the 
European Court of Justice.  
                                                 
* Reader in Law, Durham University. I am grateful to the participants to the Liverpool conference on 
50 Years of the European Treaties for a very fruitful discussion. I am indebted to Lorenzo Zucca and 
Michael Dougan for their comments on an earlier draft. The usual disclaimer applies. 
1
 Eg the Treaty amendments and the proclamation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, both 
discussed below. 
2
 Eg the limited scope of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the limited mandate of the EU 
Fundamental Rights Agency: see n 15 below. 
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II. The Development of Fundamental Rights in the EU: A 
Historical Introduction 
As is well known, the original Treaty of Rome did not contain any reference to 
fundamental rights; but this lacuna in the Treaties was soon filled by means of 
judicial interpretation. Thus, the European Court of Justice held that fundamental 
rights formed part of the general (unwritten) principles of Community law which 
bound the European institutions.
3
 While we shall examine in the next sections the 
extent to which fundamental rights as general principles of Community law bind the 
Member States, the decision to include fundamental rights in the general principles of 
law which the European institutions must respect is, and was, not particularly 
controversial. Rather, it is unthinkable that either the national or the Community 
judiciary would have allowed the Member States to derogate, by means of an action 
at Community level, from that minimum floor of rights that they themselves had 
signed up to in the European Convention of Human Rights (not to speak about their 
national constitutions).
4
 And indeed, a few years after the Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft ruling,
5
 the Council, the Commission and the European 
Parliament issued a joint declaration endorsing the case law of the court and 
committing themselves to respecting fundamental rights as general principles of 
                                                 
3
 Case 29/69, Stauder v City of Ulm [1969] ECR 419; Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft 
[1970] ECR 1125; and Case 4/73, Nold v Commission [1974] ECR 491.  
4
 The court has been accused of having been forced into this step by recalcitrant national constitutional 
courts, since in the earlier cases, it had failed to recognise fundamental rights: see Case 1/58, Stork v 
High Authority [1959] ECR 17, 26; Joined Cases 36–40/59, Geitling v High Authority [1960] ECR 
425; and to a certain extent Case 40/64, Sgarlata v Commission [1965] ECR 215. However, the present 
writer does not share this criticism and believes that the way in which the questions had been phrased 
in these cases, referring to national constitutional rights, determined the ECJ’s response. In Case 29/69, 
above n 3, the reference was phrased in relation to the general principles of Community law and the 
court’s answer was positive. 
5
 Case 11/70, above n 3. 
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Community law.
6
 Thereinafter, each Treaty revision included a fundamental rights 
‘element’. The preamble to the Single European Act referred to the Member States’ 
determination ‘to promote democracy’ on the basis of fundamental rights as 
recognised in national constitutions and in the ECHR; the Treaty of Maastricht 
included an express obligation for the European Union to respect fundamental rights,
7
 
while the Treaty of Amsterdam introduced a mechanism to ‘suspend’ a Member State 
in the case of a serious and persistent breach of fundamental rights.
8
 The Treaty of 
Nice established the Council’s power to make recommendations to a Member State in 
the event of a clear risk of a serious breach of fundamental rights,
9
 as well as 
providing the occasion for the institutions’ joint proclamation of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights.
10
 And finally, the Treaty of Lisbon would give full legal effect 
to the Charter, as well as provide for the Union’s competence to accede to the 
European Convention of Human Rights.
11
 
The developments herein mentioned by no means exhaust the Union’s activity in 
relation to fundamental rights protection.
12
 Rather, they have been recalled for three 
reasons: first, because they constitute the expression at the highest political level of 
the emergence of a fundamental rights discourse in the Union’s political and legal 
rhetoric; secondly, they illustrate well the dual dimension of such rhetoric, which 
seeks to impact on the European and on the national discourse; thirdly, they highlight 
the gradual process of transformation of the fundamental rights rhetoric from a 
political discourse to a legal one.  
                                                 
6
 Joint Declaration by the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission concerning the 
protection of fundamental rights and the European Convention for the protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms [1977] OJ C103/1. 
7
 Art F TEU (Maastricht). 
8
 Art 7 TEU (Amsterdam). 
9
 Art 7 TEU (Nice). 
10
 [2000] OJ C364/1. 
11
 Art 6 of the revised TEU (see consolidated version published at [2008] OJ C115). 
12
 Eg the establishment of the European Human Rights Agency; Art 13 EC granting competence to 
fight discrimination on grounds other than nationality. 
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This process, then, can be seen from a historical perspective as one of the most 
tangible effects of the constitutional development of the European project. Even 
leaving aside the earlier reactions to the court’s case law, it is clear that the inclusion 
of what is currently Article 6 TEU in the Maastricht Treaty was deemed necessary to 
complement (and maybe to legitimise and support) the expansion of the European 
Communities’/Union’s activities so as to include the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy and what was then Justice and Home Affairs. However, it should be noted that, 
while there cannot be any doubt that the obligations in the current Article 6 TEU 
were, and are, legally binding, the Treaty drafters excluded the jurisdiction of the 
court. Therefore, the provision was of little direct relevance for citizens, who could 
not rely on it to challenge the acts of the institutions in the sphere of the second and 
third pillar. The impossibility of enforcing Article 6 TEU was, of course, a side effect 
of the very nature of Union competence in these fields: since Union acts needed 
implementation in national law in order to produce legal effects beyond the sphere of 
international law, the enforcement of fundamental rights could be guaranteed by 
means of national law. Thus, the importance of Article 6 TEU has never been merely 
symbolic: in creating a clear obligation for the Union institutions, it could arguably 
inform the interpretation and application of national legislation adopted to implement 
Union acts.  
Moreover, the centrality of the values enshrined in Article 6 TEU for the Union 
project is later reinforced: the Treaty of Amsterdam extended the jurisdiction of the 
court to the so-called third pillar (albeit on a voluntary basis); and made respect of 
Article 6 TEU both a precondition for accession to the Union, and the precondition 
for the full exercise of the prerogatives of Union membership. Thus, while the 
possibility of suspending voting rights for breaches of fundamental rights provided in 
Article 7 TEU can be cynically seen as a piece of empty rhetoric,
13
 which is there to 
                                                 
13
 Eg the failure to use the Art 7 TEU procedure against Italy in relation to the excessive concentration 
of the media in the hands of Mr Berlusconi during his periods as prime minister: see generally, R 
Crauford-Smith, ‘Rethinking European Union competence in the field of media ownership: the internal 
market, fundamental rights and European citizenship’ (2004) 29 EL Rev 652 and references therein 
included. Also, the debate about the fingerprinting of Roma families in Italy (see Plenary session of the 
European Parliament, 8 July 2008). 
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embellish the Union more than to ensure that a minimum standard of fundamental 
rights protection is maintained throughout the 27 Member States, its symbolic value 
cannot be underestimated. The effect of Article 7 TEU is to create a revolving door 
which links a ‘bottom up’ approach with a ‘top down’ approach. If fundamental rights 
as general principles of Union law are a by-product of national constitutional 
traditions, such general principles might bounce back in national law, so that any 
systematic derogation from those principles could, at least potentially, give rise to a 
reaction at the Union level. Even though the threshold for triggering the suspension 
mechanism is very high and the mechanism is politically extremely sensitive, its 
existence is significant in that it links the national and the Union fundamental rights 
discourses. In this sense, it could be argued that Article 7 TEU might help to 
legitimise the court’s enforcement of the general principles against Member States 
(which shall be examined in detail in the next section).  
Finally, the gradual but constant evolution of the fundamental rights rhetoric from 
political to legal discourse again highlights the centrality of such rhetoric in 
legitimising the expansion of Union competences. Thus, the very idea of drafting a 
Charter of Fundamental Rights was also due to the need to provide greater legitimacy 
for the Union’s action both in the field of foreign policy and in the field of 
cooperation in criminal matters. In relation to foreign policy, it was felt that a Union 
Charter of Fundamental Rights might help to provide legitimacy for the increased 
frequency in the use of human rights conditionality clauses.
14
 As for cooperation in 
criminal matters, it is obvious that the existence of a clear catalogue of rights might 
reinforce not only the legitimacy of action taken in such a delicate field, but also the 
guarantees for individuals.  
These progresses and their significance should not therefore be underestimated. And 
yet, the most important force behind the development of fundamental rights in the 
European Union is, unsurprisingly, the European Court of Justice. In this respect, 
while the political institutions attempted to safeguard an element of national 
                                                 
14
 On the possible reasons that might have created the momentum for the decision to draft a Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, see E Paciotti, ‘La Carta: i contenuti e gli autori’ in A Manzella, P Melograni, E 
Paciotti and S Rodotà, Riscrivere i diritti in Europa (Il Mulino, Bologna, 2001).  
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sovereignty over fundamental rights protection,
15
 the case law, especially in the past 
10 years, has seen strong centralising elements.  
 
III. Conflicting Forces in the Case Law of the ECJ: 
Centralisation Versus Federalisation 
We have mentioned above that, in the early 1970s, the court held that the European 
Communities were bound by fundamental rights as general principles of Community 
law.
16
 As we have said, this step was not particularly controversial: it is natural that 
the benchmark for the European institutions should be that set by the European Court 
of Justice with reference to the general principles of Community law.  
More controversial, however, is the decision to extend the application of fundamental 
rights as general principles of Community law to acts of the Member States. This step 
was first taken in relation to domestic acts which are adopted with a view to 
implementing a Community act.
17
 The reasoning behind this intrusion in the national 
fundamental rights arena is simple enough. When the Member State implements 
Community law, it is acting as an ‘agent’ of the Community, and as such it cannot 
breach those rights which bind the Community legislature.
18
 Furthermore, it is likely 
that this principle applies also in relation to framework decisions adopted pursuant to 
                                                 
15
 Eg the Charter applies to the Member States only when they implement EU law, and not when they 
act within the field of EU law; the European Human Rights Agency [2007] OJ L53/1 is only concerned 
with Member States when they implement Community law, and has only ‘reporting’ powers.  
16
 Case 29/69, above n 3; and more clearly Case 11/70, above n 3. 
17
 Case 5/88, Wachauf [1989] ECR 2609; Joined Cases C-20 & 64/00, Booker Aquaculture Ltd v 
Scottish Ministers [2003] ECR I-7411; it should be noted that a link between free movement and 
fundamental rights had already been established in Case 36/75, Rutili v Minister for the Interior [1975] 
ECR 1219. 
18
 On the confusion as to the extent of this obligation, see A Arnull, A Dashwood, M Dougan, M Ross, 
E Spaventa and D Wyatt, Wyatt and Dashwood’s EU Law, 5th edn (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2006), 
267–8.  
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Title VI TEU (the third pillar),
19
 although the extent to which fundamental rights 
might become directly effective through the medium of Union law is open to 
debate.
20
  
In any event, in relation to acts of the Member States implementing 
Community/Union law, when there is a different standard between domestic and 
Community fundamental rights, and provided the Member State is exercising some 
discretion, the highest standard should prevail. Where it is impossible to determine 
whether the national or Community standard is higher, for instance because the 
matter involves the balancing of conflicting rights, then the Community standard 
should apply and the ultimate arbiter would be the European Court of Justice. This 
approach has been codified in the Charter, which applies only to the acts of the Union 
institutions and to the acts of the Member States when they implement Union law.
21
  
 
A. The ERT and Familiapress Case Law: Balancing Centralisation and 
Federalisation 
A more problematic step is that of extending the application of fundamental rights as 
general principles of Community law to the actions of the Member States whenever 
the matter falls within the scope of Community law, and in particular, when the 
Member State is limiting one of the free movement rights. This case law originated 
with the ERT decision.
22
 There, the court held that, when a Member State relies on the 
Treaty to justify a derogation from one of the free movement rights, it has to respect 
                                                 
19
 Case C-105/03, Pupino [2005] ECR I-5285. 
20
 On this point, see E Spaventa, ‘Opening Pandora’s Box: Some Reflections on the Constitutional 
Effects of the Ruling in Pupino’ (2007) 3 European Constitutional Law Review 5; and ‘Remembrance 
of Principles Lost: on Fundamental Rights, the Third Pillar and the Scope of Union Law’ (2006) 24 
Yearbook of European Law 153. 
21
 Art 51 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2007] OJ C303/1. 
22
 Case C-260/89, Elliniki Radiophonia Tileorassi AE (ERT) v Dimotiki Étairia Pliroforissis (DEP) 
[1991] ECR I-2925. 
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fundamental rights as a matter of Community law. In Familiapress,
23
 the same 
reasoning applied to situations in which the Member State is limiting (rather than 
derogating from) the free movement rights and is therefore relying on the mandatory 
requirements doctrine. Furthermore, it now appears that this case law should apply in 
the same way also to situations concerning limitations to one of the rights associated 
with Union citizenship.
24
  
There are two concurring reasons why the extension of the field of application of the 
general principles of Community law is debatable. First of all, the effect of such case 
law is to render fundamental rights as general principles of Community law directly 
effective in the national system. In this respect, consider that fundamental rights 
scrutiny and the power to strike down conflicting legislation, when at all available,
25
 
is usually reserved to specialised or higher courts. However, through the medium of 
Community law, any national court or tribunal acquires the power and the duty to 
scrutinise those rules which are deemed to fall within the scope of Community law as 
to their compatibility with fundamental rights.
26
 Secondly, the constant extension of 
                                                 
23
 Case C-368/95, Vereinigte Familiapress Zeitungsverlags- und vertriebs GmbH v Heinrich Bauer 
Verlag [1997] ECR I-3689. 
24
 Arts 17 ff EC. There is no ruling on this specific point as yet. However, in Case C-413/99, Baumbast 
and R v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] ECR I-7091, the court applied the ‘general 
principle of proportionality to limitations to the right of residence’, and there is therefore no reason 
why other general principles, including fundamental rights, should not be applicable. On this point, see 
M Dougan and E Spaventa, ‘Educating Rudy and the (non-)English Patient: A Double-Bill on 
Residency Rights under Article 18 EC’ (2003) 28 EL Rev 699. See also Case C-300/04, Eman and 
Sevinger [2006] ECR I-8055, which is on the principle of equality, but should apply a fortiori to all 
fundamental rights. In relation to deportation and the public policy derogation, the court has already 
had the chance to uphold its fundamental rights jurisprudence also in relation to Union citizenship: see 
Joined Cases C-482 & 493/01, Orfanopoulos and Olivieri [2004] ECR I-5257.  
25
 In the UK there is no such power; rather according to s 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998, the national 
courts can only make a declaration of incompatibility which triggers an accelerated procedure for 
amendment of the legislation at stake (s 10). The European Court of Human Rights has declared such a 
remedy (for the time being) not effective: see, eg Burden v UK (Application no 13378/05).  
26
 On this point, see E Spaventa, ‘Seeing the Wood Despite the Trees? On the Scope of Union 
Citizenship and its Constitutional Effects’ (2008) 44 CML Rev 13. 
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the scope of the Treaty, and the uncertain boundaries of the free movement 
provisions, render the ERT/Familiapress case law of pervasive constitutional impact.  
And yet, the interpretation of the court is entirely consistent with its premises. Indeed, 
it would seem peculiar if the Member State could legitimately invoke a Treaty 
derogation or justify a limitation to a free movement right if, in doing so, it breached 
not only the right to move of the claimant but also her fundamental rights. And even 
should one not adhere to Mr Jacobs’ opinion that all migrant citizens should be 
reassured that moving will never entail a loss in fundamental rights protection,
27
 one 
can well justify the court’s interpretation. After all, the hermeneutic principle driving 
the fundamental rights jurisprudence is exactly the same as that driving the 
proportionality assessment: limitations to the right to move must be proportionate 
because proportionality is a general principle of Union law. It would then be strange 
if proportionality were the only general principle to apply to such limitations. 
Therefore, the misgivings one could have about the court’s case law might really be 
with its extensive interpretation of what constitutes a barrier to movement: it is that 
interpretation which causes what, to some, might seem as undue interference with 
national autonomy in setting the fundamental rights standards in the domestic arena.
28
  
Furthermore, it should be noticed that the centralising approach inherent in this case 
law is tamed, in both ERT and Familiapress, by the fact (first) that the assessment as 
to the balance between conflicting interests is left to the national court and (secondly) 
that, in any event, the Treaty rights are used to enhance the protection of fundamental 
rights and not to interfere with it. As a result, the standard of fundamental rights 
protection should again always be the highest between the national and Community 
law standards. 
 
B. The Second Line of Case Law: Towards a More Centralising 
Approach 
                                                 
27
 Opinion in Case C-168/91, Konstantinidis v Stadt Altensteig, Standesamt und Landratsamt Calw, 
Ordnungsamt [1993] ECR I-1191. 
28
 On this point, see E Spaventa, above n 26. 
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However, in a second stage, the court seems eager to assess for itself the correct 
balance to be struck between competing interests when there is a Community element 
involved. The more interventionist approach is visible, for instance, in Carpenter,
29
 
where the assessment of the fundamental rights element appears to be predominant. 
Interventionism is also apparent in those cases where the court instructs the national 
referring court to take into due account the fundamental rights of the claimant, even 
though it itself found no evidence of the existence of a barrier to intra-Community 
movement capable of bringing the matter within the scope of Community law.
30
  
The more proactive approach towards fundamental rights protection, which might 
well reflect a change in the court’s perception of its own role, is visible also in the 
case of Ferstersen.
31
 There, rather unusually as well as unnecessarily, the court 
referred to the European Convention on Human Rights in scrutinising a residence 
requirement. In the case at issue, the question related to the compatibility with 
Community law of a requirement that those who purchased agricultural property took 
up fixed residence in the property. As is well known, a residence requirement always 
constitutes indirect discrimination
32
; as such it not only falls within the scope of the 
Treaty, but it is also difficult to justify, since territorial requirements go against the 
very idea of the freedom to move freely granted by Community law.
33
 One could 
have well imagined then that any reference to Article 2 Protocol 4 ECHR on the right 
to move would be wholly unnecessary. This is especially the case since the right to 
                                                 
29
 Case C-60/00, Carpenter v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] ECR I-6279. 
30
 Case C-109/01, Secretary of State for the Home Department v H Akrich [2003] ECR I-9607. For an 
attempt to justify the requirement of a fundamental rights review, see E Spaventa, Annotation of 
Akrich (2005) 42 CML Rev 225; Case C-71/02, H Karner Industrie-Auktionen GmbH v Triistwijk 
Gesmbj [2004] ECR I-3025; and F De Cecco, ‘Room to Move? Minimum Harmonization and 
Fundamental Rights’ (2006) 43 CML Rev 9. 
31
 Case C-370/05, Festersen [2007] ECR I-1129. 
32
 Consistent case law, eg Case 152/73, Sotgiu [1974] ECR 153; Case 33/74, van Binsbergen [1974] 
ECR 1299; and Case C-111/91, Commission v Luxembourg [1993] ECR I-817. 
33
 In the case of the free movement of services, residence requirements are the ‘very negation’ of the 
freedom granted by the Treaty (see Case 205/84, Commission v Germany [1986] ECR 3755) and so are 
even more difficult to justify. 
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move provided therein refers to intra-state movement and not inter-state movement, 
and that, in any event, one would think, the right to move in Community law goes far 
beyond the rights granted by the above-mentioned Protocol. 
This case law signals a much more interventionist approach and as such demonstrates 
a willingness on behalf of the court to engage with the fundamental rights discourse 
beyond what might be seen as required by the demands of the internal market. What 
is relevant from a constitutional law perspective is that, as a result of this centralising 
tendency, national courts are pre-empted in carrying out their own (national) 
fundamental rights assessment. However, and as mentioned above, this step is still 
constitutionally justified in that fundamental rights and Treaty freedoms concur in 
affording the most extensive protection to the individual, albeit at the expense of 
national regulatory autonomy.  
 
C. The Third Line of Case Law: Fundamental Rights to Justify a 
Restriction to the Free Movement Provisions 
A slightly different scenario occurs when the Member State relies on the need to 
protect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by national law, to justify a restriction to 
the free movement provisions. This possibility, already evident in Familiapress, was 
fully explored in Omega.
34
 In that case, Germany sought to justify the prohibition on 
games mimicking the killing of people by relying on the need to protect human 
dignity as a value enshrined in the German Constitution. The court accepted that the 
protection of a constitutionally enshrined value could fall within the scope of the 
public policy derogation. In this respect, the court clarified that, in order to assess the 
proportionality and the necessity of the rules at issue, ‘[i]t is not indispensable … for 
the restrictive measure issued by the authorities of a Member State to correspond to a 
conception shared by all Member States as regards the precise way in which the 
fundamental right or legitimate interest in question is to be protected’.35 In Omega, it 
                                                 
34
 Case C-36/02, Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v Oberbürgermeisterin der 
Bundesstadt Bonn [2004] ECR I-9609. 
35
 Omega, para 37.  
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is made clear that the Community free movement provisions will not (necessarily) 
force upon Member States a ‘levelling’ down of fundamental rights protection. In 
other words, there is space for a departure from a minimum standard of fundamental 
rights. The standard in fundamental rights is supervised by the European Court of 
Justice, but is still left to the discretion of Member States. In this respect, the 
centralising effect is minimal, relating simply to a supervisory role of the court, and 
the ‘federalising’ tendency appears predominant. This said, there is a fourth line of 
case law which, while at first sight appearing similar to the Omega case law, is more 
problematic.  
 
IV. Assessing Conflict of Rights 
The fourth, and in my opinion more complex development, is that relating to the 
Schmidberger case law.
36
  
 
A. The Ruling in Schmidberger 
It might be recalled that the Schmidberger case arose as a result of a previous ruling 
of the court. In Commission v France,
37
 the court held that Member States could be in 
breach of their Treaty obligations if they fail to actively protect enjoyment of the 
Treaty rights. In Schmidberger, an environmental group staged a demonstration on 
the Brenner motorway to protest against a planned expansion of the motorway. 
Schmidberger, an international transport company, brought proceedings to claim 
Francovich damages against the Austrian authorities on the grounds that, by allowing 
the demonstration to proceed, they had failed to protect the claimant’s rights under 
Article 28 EC. The court held that the failure to prevent the demonstration was to be 
qualified as a measure having equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction on 
                                                 
36
 Case C-112/00, Schmidberger [2003] ECR I-5659. 
37
 Case C-265/95, Commission v France [1997] ECR I-6959. 
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imports; and that it was justified having regard to the fundamental right of freedom of 
expression. At this point, it is useful to quote directly from the court’s judgment: 
77. The case thus raises the question of the need to reconcile the requirements of the 
protection of fundamental rights in the Community with those arising from a 
fundamental freedom enshrined in the Treaty and, more particularly, the question of 
the respective scope of freedom of expression and freedom of assembly, guaranteed 
by Articles 10 and 11 of the ECHR, and of the free movement of goods, where the 
former are relied upon as justification for a restriction of the latter. 
78. First, whilst the free movement of goods constitutes one of the fundamental 
principles in the scheme of the Treaty, it may, in certain circumstances, be subject to 
restrictions for the reasons laid down in Article 36 [now 30] of that Treaty or for 
overriding requirements relating to the public interest … 
79. Second, whilst the fundamental rights at issue in the main proceedings are 
expressly recognised by the ECHR and constitute the fundamental pillars of a 
democratic society, it nevertheless follows from the express wording of paragraph 2 
of Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention that freedom of expression and freedom of 
assembly are also subject to certain limitations justified by objectives in the public 
interest, in so far as those derogations are in accordance with the law, motivated by 
one or more of the legitimate aims under those provisions and necessary in a 
democratic society, that is to say justified by a pressing social need and, in particular, 
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued … 
80. Thus, unlike other fundamental rights enshrined in that Convention, such as the 
right to life or the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment, which admit of no restriction, neither the freedom of expression nor the 
freedom of assembly guaranteed by the ECHR appears to be absolute but must be 
viewed in relation to its social purpose. Consequently, the exercise of those rights 
may be restricted, provided that the restrictions in fact correspond to objectives of 
general interest and do not, taking account of the aim of the restrictions, constitute 
disproportionate and unacceptable interference, impairing the very substance of the 
rights guaranteed … 
81. In those circumstances, the interests involved must be weighed having regard to 
all the circumstances of the case in order to determine whether a fair balance was 
struck between those interests. 
82. The competent authorities enjoy a wide margin of discretion in that regard. 
Nevertheless, it is necessary to determine whether the restrictions placed upon intra-
Community trade are proportionate in the light of the legitimate objective pursued, 
namely, in the present case, the protection of fundamental rights. 
… 
91. An action of that type usually entails inconvenience for non-participants, in 
particular as regards free movement, but the inconvenience may in principle be 
tolerated provided that the objective pursued is essentially the public and lawful 
demonstration of an opinion [emphasis added throughout].  
At first sight, the Schmidberger ruling might appear both inoffensive and balanced. 
After all, the end result is exactly what one might have expected and desired. And yet, 
the case signals a move towards centralisation which is qualitatively different and 
greater, since the effect of the court’s interpretation is that of conferring upon itself 
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the hermeneutic monopoly over the possible clash between a fundamental (non-
economic) right and a Treaty right. Here, consider that there is a substantial 
difference between this case and Omega. In the latter, what was at stake was a rule 
which, while aimed at the protection of fundamental rights, also directly restricted the 
enjoyment of one of the Treaty freedoms. In Schmidberger, on the other hand, what is 
at stake is not a direct barrier imposed by the state, but rather the failure of the state to 
curtail a fundamental right.  
In the writer’s opinion, the effect of the court’s choice to define the legitimate 
exercise of fundamental rights as a barrier to Community movement is conceptually 
problematic. In particular, the following issues deserve closer attention. 
First, even though the court accepts that fundamental rights might prevail even over 
the Treaty rights, it seems to put the two on the same level. As a result, the language 
used by the court is resonant of that used in relation to a clash of fundamental rights. 
And yet, one should be careful in accepting this premise as one which can be 
constitutionally justified. The Treaty rights might well be ‘fundamental’ to the 
achievement of European integration, and they might well be very important to Union 
citizens, but they are radically and qualitatively different from fundamental human 
rights recognised by the European Convention or in bills of rights across Europe. The 
Treaty rights are instrumental to the achievement of a political project; and they are 
rights which derive from a Treaty. Those rights would not, and do not, exist outside 
the Treaty providing for them. Furthermore, the constituency of right-holders is 
limited not only through the requirement of nationality; but also because those 
(Treaty) ‘fundamental rights’ are conditional upon movement and, in cases of 
mobility which is less transient in nature, also upon the satisfaction of given 
economic prerequisites, be those economic activity or economic independence.
38
  
Fundamental rights, on the other hand, are those that we recognise, if not altogether 
inherent to, at least as being at the very core of our understanding of humanity. These 
rights do not necessarily need to be codified and are available to any person, 
                                                 
38
 Ie for stays of more than three months: see Art 7 Directive 2004/38 on the right of citizens of the 
Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States 
[2004] OJ L229/35.  
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regardless of nationality or wealth. They are not ‘granted’ by a legal document, but 
rather recognised in legal documents.
39
 Without entering into the debate about the 
true nature of fundamental rights, this understanding of some rights as ‘fundamental’ 
is evident in the Union’s own Charter of Fundamental Rights, which does not ‘create’ 
rights, but simply makes them more visible, and which recognises that some rights 
are available regardless of possessing Union citizenship.
40
  
The use of the same terminology, that of fundamental rights, to identify two radically 
different types of rights is thus debatable; it suggests a homogeneity which is not 
conceptually sound and might lead to the classification of those ‘spurious’ conflicts of 
rights as true clashes of fundamental rights.
41
 And this erroneous classification is not 
simply a matter of terminology: rather, it might deceive as to the respective strength 
of competing claims; and as to the hermeneutic path that the interpreter should take in 
order to solve instances of conflict. 
Secondly, the language of the court very much reflects this error in classification, 
leading to another flaw in the way in which the fundamental rights discourse is 
articulated in the jurisprudence. In Schmidberger, the court found that the failure of 
the Austrian authorities to ban the demonstration which led to an interruption in the 
Brenner motorway was to be qualified as a measure having equivalent effect; it 
therefore had to be ‘objectively’ justified.42 The court then held that:  
                                                 
39
 This is certainly true for the European Community or else it would have been impossible for the 
court to develop its general principles case law.  
40
 We shall not enter into the debate as to whether the drafters’ intention of avoiding a hierarchy of 
rights in the Charter has been fulfilled; in any event the scope of the rights in the Charter, and therefore 
the extent to which they can be protected, varies considerably from right to right. In this respect, 
consider also the distinction between ‘principles’ and ‘rights’ as drawn in Art 52(5) Charter (2007 
version).  
41
 On spurious conflicts, see L Zucca, Constitutional Dilemmas. Conflict of Fundamental Legal Rights 
in Europe and the USA (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007) and ‘Conflicts of Rights as 
Constitutional Dilemmas’ in E Brems (ed), Conflicts between fundamental rights (Antwerp/Oxford, 
Intersentia, 2008) 19. See further below. 
42
 Case C-112/00, above n 36, para 64. 
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… since both the Community and its Member States are required to respect 
fundamental rights, the protection of those rights is a legitimate interest which, in 
principle, justifies a restriction of the obligations imposed by Community law, even 
under a fundamental freedom guaranteed by the Treaty such as the free movement of 
goods.
43
  
The problem with this line of reasoning is that it suggests the demotion of 
fundamental rights from ‘individual’ rights to public policy reasons; from 
fundamental rights to legitimate interests, albeit interests which might prevail even 
over the free movement of goods. Furthermore, while at first sight it might seem that 
the court either altogether rejects a hierarchy of rights; or privileges fundamental 
rights over Treaty rights, its analysis leads to the opposite conclusion, giving the 
impression of a hierarchical superiority of the Treaty rights over fundamental rights. 
The stress is, in fact, on the limitation of the right to move in Community law: 
freedom of expression is nothing but a limitation to this right which might (or might 
not) be legitimate.  
The rest of the Schmidberger ruling confirms this reversal of priorities: thus, the 
Member State is called upon to justify the fact that it has not restricted a fundamental 
right. Since the right to freedom of expression can be restricted, the Member State 
might be under a Community law duty to do so. Whilst it is clear that there is no 
conflict of duties between Convention and Treaty, and that the Convention rights 
might sometimes be reinforced, since their breach might also constitute a breach of 
Community law, the Schimidberger ruling implies a positive duty to use the margin 
of appreciation recognised by the European Court of Human Rights so as to limit 
rights conferred by the Convention. The soundness of this interpretation might well 
be doubted, especially having regard to the fact that the Convention only recognises a 
basic floor of rights; and that the very idea of the margin of appreciation, and its use 
in relation (in particular) to the freedom of expression, has been heavily criticised.
44
 
The fallacious premise which laid the foundation for the court’s reasoning—that of 
the homogeneity between Treaty rights and fundamental rights—then leads it to 
reverse the fundamental rights discourse. Fundamental rights are transformed from 
                                                 
43
 Ibid, para 74 (emphasis added).  
44
 For an account, see J Sweeney, ‘A “Margin of Appreciation” in the internal market: lessons from the 
European Court of Human Rights’ (2007) 34 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 27.  
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individual rights to a ‘legitimate interest’, to public policy reasons; and the Treaty 
rights become a vehicle to impose upon Member States a restrictive approach to 
fundamental rights, so that the margin of appreciation is transformed from an 
instrument, however debatable, which acknowledges some pluralism in our 
understanding of the precise content of fundamental rights, into a useful tool to 
enforce the primacy of Treaty rights. Furthermore, this mode of reasoning determines 
two important consequences: first of all, it allows the court to claim a hermeneutic 
monopoly over the way in which conflicts between economic Treaty rights and 
fundamental rights are determined; secondly, and perhaps more importantly, it 
deprives the interpreter of any useful framework to assess how these conflicts should 
be solved, which in turn might lead to a loss of legitimacy once a decision has been 
taken. We shall now turn to the two cases that brought these problems into greater 
light.  
 
B. The Rulings in Viking and Laval  
The Schmidberger case was an easy one: it was unsurprising that the court indicated 
that the Austrian authorities had not failed in their duties under Community law in 
allowing the demonstration to take place. And yet, as we have seen in the previous 
section, the reasoning of the court was conceptually flawed.  
Those flaws were, in the eyes of many commentators,
45
 fully exposed in two 
subsequent cases that dealt with the conflict between Treaty rights and fundamental 
rights. In both cases, the issue at stake related to the extent to which the exercise of 
collective action could be construed as a barrier to the free movement rights. In 
Viking, the trade unions engaged in transnational collective action to prevent the 
                                                 
45
 See, eg C Barnard, ‘Social Dumping or Dumping Socialism?’ (2008) 67 CLJ 262, as well as her 
contribution to this volume; P Sirpis and T Novitz ‘Economic and social rights in conflict: political and 
judicial approaches to their reconciliation’ (2008) 33 EL Rev 411; and ACL Davies ‘One step forward, 
two steps back? The Viking and Laval cases in the ECJ’ (2008) 37 ILJ 126.  
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flagging of convenience of a ship
46
; in Laval, coordinated collective action was taken 
in order to enforce local working conditions against a company which used foreign 
workers as posted workers.
47
 The legal situation in those cases was slightly different 
from that at issue in Schmidberger in that, in the latter, the case arose as a result of a 
Francovich action taken against the state for its failure to protect the Treaty rights of 
the claimant, while in Viking and Laval, the Treaty was invoked directly by private 
parties against the trade unions. 
Notwithstanding this difference, however, the starting premise of the Viking and 
Laval rulings is the same as that in Schmidberger: the protection of fundamental 
rights is a legitimate interest which must be ‘reconciled with the requirements 
relating to the rights protected under the Treaty and in accordance with the principle 
of proportionality’.48 The stress in favour of Treaty rights is even more pronounced in 
Viking and Laval than it was in Schmidberger: it is the exercise of the fundamental 
right that must be proportionate. Thus, the traditional fundamental rights assessment 
is rebutted: rather than construing the exercise of a Treaty right as a possible 
interference with a fundamental right, an interference that would have to be 
proportionate according to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, it is 
the exercise of the fundamental right that is construed as an interference with a (more) 
fundamental Treaty right and that must therefore be proportionate.  
The consequences are far reaching and clearly visible in both cases. First of all, the 
assessment of the respective strengths between competing interests is centralised in 
the hands of the European Court of Justice.  
Secondly, in both cases, the trade unions see imposed upon them a duty not to 
interfere with the Treaty rights of the economic operators. This fact further 
strengthens the Treaty right in comparison to the fundamental right, which is not 
horizontal unless national legislation provides for a duty upon the social partners to 
                                                 
46
 Case C-438/05, The International Workers’ Federation and the Finnish Seamen’s Union v Viking 
Line (judgment of 11 December 2007).  
47
 Case C-341/05, Laval un Partneri (judgment of 18 December 2007). See also C Barnard’s 
contribution in this volume.  
48
 Viking, para 46 (emphasis added). 
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respect it; and, as noted by Giubboni, imposes upon the trade unions the duty to take 
into consideration not only the interests of the parties they represent, but also the 
interest of the counterparties they are acting against.
49
 In this way, the very nature of 
collective action as a means to solve a labour dispute is deprived of its very raison 
d’être.  
Thirdly, as a result, the conditions that determine the legitimate exercise of collective 
action are subsumed within the hermeneutic monopoly of the court and are subtracted 
from negotiation between the different stake-holders. The social partners then loose a 
‘voice’ in the collective process that determines the acceptable limits of the right to 
take collective action, on the one hand, and the duty to respect some predefined rules 
of the game that have been negotiated with the other social partners.  
Fourthly, the trade unions might face financial liability for the (otherwise legitimate) 
exercise of a fundamental right. 
The consequences of the Viking and Laval rulings are then far-reaching and deeply 
affect the balance of power between social parties. In this respect, those rulings 
exemplify the problems inherent in the premises from which the court starts. Leaving 
aside the peculiarities of those cases, however, the court’s approach raises more 
general problems in relation to the centralisation of fundamental rights scrutiny, to 
which we shall now turn. 
 
V. Centralisation and its Problems 
                                                 
49
 Paper (unpublished) presented as the Modern Law Review workshop ‘Developing Solidarity in the 
EU: Citizenship, Governance and New Constitutional Paradigms’ held at the University of Sussex (5 
May 2008).  
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The fundamental rights rhetoric endorsed by the court in the early 1970s undoubtedly 
contributed to the legitimisation of the Communities/Union
50
; and such legitimising 
function would have been impossible without a degree of centralisation.  
In relation to Union acts, and given the principle of supremacy as well as the Foto-
Frost doctrine,
51
 centralisation is not only desirable, but also essential to the Union’s 
own functioning.
52
 An act of the Union must be assessed in relation to the Union’s 
own constitutional system. If a Union act is deemed unlawful, such an act must be 
void across the entire territory of the Union. In this respect, a limited degree of 
differentiation in fundamental rights protection is inevitable: the Union fundamental 
rights standard might be sometimes lower, and sometimes higher, than that which 
would be enforced at national level. Yet, given that, in any event, it cannot fall below 
the ECHR standard,
53
 such oscillations are acceptable within the Union system.
54
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 See N Walker, ‘Human Rights in a Postnational Order: Reconciling Political and Constitutional 
Pluralism’ in Campbell, Ewing and Tomkins (eds), Sceptical Essays on Human Rights (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2001) 119.  
51
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(eds), Legal Issues of the Amsterdam Treaty (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 1999) 109; and ‘The Rule of 
Law in the European Union’ in A Arnull and D Wincott (eds), Accountability and Legitimacy in the 
European Union (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002) 239. In favour, see E Spaventa, 
‘Remembrance of Principles Lost: on Fundamental Rights, the Third Pillar and the Scope of Union 
Law’ (2006) 25 Yearbook of European Law 153.  
53
 Which of course does not mean that it never falls below the ECHR standard: consider, eg the 
problems with the limited jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice in relation to the third pillar; or 
compare the ECJ’s rather conservative approach in Joined Cases C-122 & 125/99, D and Sweden v 
Council [2001] ECR I-4319 with the ECtHR ruling in Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v Portugal 
(Application No 33290/96; judgment of 21 December 1999).  
54
 See also the German Constitutional Law Court’s ruling in the so-called Solange 2 ruling [1987] 3 
CMLR 225. 
 
22 
In relation to national law limiting or derogating from a Treaty right, centralisation is 
also not problematic from a fundamental rights perspective
55
: in those cases, 
fundamental rights and Treaty rights concur in affording the maximum level of 
protection to the individual. As mentioned above, in cases where the Member State is 
exercising a discretion when implementing Community law, the standard of 
fundamental rights protection is the highest between that set by national law and that 
set by Community law. In those situations in which the Member State is derogating or 
limiting a Treaty right, Community law fundamental rights are relevant only insofar 
as they afford more protection to the individual, either because the standard is higher 
or because of the better protection afforded by the immediate and direct applicability 
of Community law. Furthermore, it appears that, in such cases, the margin of 
appreciation left by the European Court of Justice to national authorities is narrower 
than that that would be accepted in the more diversified Convention system.
56
 Finally, 
in those instances in which the Member State relies on fundamental rights in order to 
justify a limitation to a Treaty right, centralisation and federalisation appear balanced: 
subject to the supervisory role of the European Court of Justice (centralisation), the 
standard of fundamental rights protection is that chosen by the Member State 
(federalisation).
57
  
However, in those cases where a Treaty right directly clashes with the exercise of a 
fundamental right, we see a strong push towards centralisation—and such a step is 
constitutionally more problematic. We have mentioned above that the starting 
premise in these cases is that of an ontological equation between Treaty rights and 
fundamental rights which leads to the qualification of those instances as clashes of 
rights. Here, it should be considered that true clashes of rights are always difficult to 
assess. Zucca has argued that ‘genuine’ clashes of rights are not only difficult, but 
impossible to adjudicate: the process of adjudication between two competing rights of 
equal force, what he identifies as a true clash, is the result of value judgments made 
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by the adjudicator, be that a court or the legislature, which transcend the legal 
process.
58
 In other words, the hermeneutic process does not help in finding a solution 
to true clashes of rights and, in those cases, the balancing exercise reflects the 
preferences of the adjudicator. 
However, Zucca claims that true clashes of rights are much rarer than one might 
think. Rather, the majority of cases, those which he identifies as spurious clashes of 
rights, involve a clash between a right and a public interest. Here, the adjudicator 
might engage in a more fruitful balancing exercise, since the balancing exercise 
focuses on the very definition of the right at stake. Thus, hermeneutic principles and 
legal reasoning can perform their full function, very much in the same way as when 
the European Court of Justice is defining the scope of the Treaty freedom and the 
extent to which Member States can invoke a public interest to limit those freedoms.  
The qualification of the clash between Treaty rights and fundamental freedoms as a 
clash of rights then distorts the perspective, leaving us in the dark as to the way in 
which the respective strengths of the competing claims should be assessed. Here, it is 
argued that a more correct classification might be helpful in the process of 
adjudication. This is not only important for the sake of national courts and legal 
clarity; it is also crucial in order to bestow legitimacy onto the entire process. 
Otherwise, adjudication might be seen as transcending the hermeneutic dimension 
and become instead a political exercise. Here, consider the following.  
The ECJ approached the Schmidberger-type problem in the following way:  
 
Treaty right (including interest in European integration)  fundamental right 
Fundamental right  fundamental right 
 
As a result of this approach, the outcome of the case will include weighing up also the 
interest in European integration (a Community public interest) against the competing 
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non-integrating fundamental right. This way of reasoning is unsatisfactory since, first, 
it does not enlighten us as to the process of adjudication and, secondly, it introduces a 
non-fundamental right variable in the fundamental right discourse.  
A more satisfactory way to look at this question might be: 
 
Right to exercise an economic activity  fundamental right 
European integration  Community public interest 
Fundamental right  fundamental right 
 
If we were to follow this route, the outcome of the case will depend only on the 
mutual strengths of the two fundamental rights in competition, and the public interest 
of the Community would be treated exactly for what it is, ie a public interest which 
might in certain cases legitimately be relied upon by the Community in order to 
restrict a competing non-economic fundamental right.  
The way of articulating the legal problem will then determine two radically different 
results. A theoretical example might serve to illustrate the difference. Let us consider 
a true clash of rights, ie a case where the conflicting claims are absolutely mutually 
exclusive so that the enjoyment of the right by an individual determines the loss of 
that same right by another. Take for instance the case of Ms Evans,
59
 where the 
European Court of Human Rights had to determine whether Ms Evans’ right to use 
her fertilised eggs, her only eggs that were available to her following treatment for 
cancer, clashed with her ex-husband’s right to withdraw consent to the use of his 
genetic material. Now, and regardless of the merits of the case,
60
 would it be 
intellectually defensible to say that, if the procedure for implant was to take place in 
another Member State, Mrs Evans’ right to move and receive services should have 
been taken into consideration as (another) fundamental right to strengthen her claim? 
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If we were to accept the court’s reasoning in Schmidberger, then the answer would 
have to be positive. However, if we properly qualify the clash of rights as being a 
clash between Article 8 ECHR rights, the fact that Ms Evans were (or were not) to 
move would be irrelevant. Similarly, and as said before, in Viking and Laval, the 
competing claims were between the workers’ rights to take collective action (either as 
part of their freedom of expression and association or as a free standing right)
61
 and 
the employers’ rights to pursue their trade or business (as part of their right to 
property). The Community dimension should have been relevant only in imposing 
upon the national authorities, or legislature, a duty not to discriminate between intra-
Community and domestic situations, not in assessing the mutual strengths of the 
rights at issue.  
Take for instance the case in which the political situation in another Member State 
attracts criticism of a human rights group elsewhere in the EU, and the latter group 
calls for a successful boycott of that Member State’s products. Should the actions of 
the group, legal in the country where they took place, be called into question because 
they have an effect on intra-Community trade? Should the human rights group have 
due regard to the Treaty freedoms when organising a boycott? After all, their actions 
might lead to as severe consequences as those faced by the businesses in Viking and 
Laval. And what should we make of a strike that stops production and therefore 
exports? Is this the way we are going to assess the strengths of competing claims?  
Furthermore, the different way of articulating the legal problem might also produce a 
different jurisdictional result. If the clash is between fundamental rights, regardless of 
the Community dimension, then the role of the European Court of Justice should be 
limited to a supervisory role, Omega-style, aimed at ensuring that claims containing a 
Community element are not treated in a different and more disadvantageous way than 
their purely domestic counterparts. However, if the clash is seen as a clash between a 
Community ‘fundamental right’ (ie the Treaty freedom) and another fundamental 
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right, Schmidberger/Viking style, then the role of the European Court of Justice will 
be predominant and the latter will gain a monopoly in assessing the mutual strengths 
of the conflicting claims.  
The way in which we choose to articulate a legal problem is of paramount 
importance, not only because it might determine the outcome of the case, but because 
it ensures the legitimacy of the adjudicating process. While it might be naive to 
believe that adjudication occurs in a political vacuum, the adjudicator cannot be seen 
as forcing his or her own societal/economic/ideological preferences as a matter of 
course. If the hermeneutic premises are faulty, the process of adjudication will be not 
only faulty, but will risk being de-legitimised. Cases involving clashes of 
fundamental rights are probably the most difficult to solve and surely the most 
controversial. However, when a court, be it national or supranational, fails to 
articulate its own discourse, it risks being accused of moving into a realm that it does 
not pertain to it, that of pure politics. Furthermore, if the legal reasoning is not 
articulated, it is impossible to predict.  
  
VI. Conclusions 
The development of a fundamental rights discourse in the European Union has 
undoubtedly strengthened the Union’s constitutional foundations as well as its 
democratic credentials. This discourse has been embraced by all of the institutional 
actors at European level: if national court and European Court of Justice have 
provided the original impetus, the political institutions have been more than ready to 
provide their own contribution to the development of a fundamental rights discourse 
in the EU. However, the process through which the fundamental rights rhetoric is 
developed is far from being linear: rather, it reflects the Union’s own constitutional 
idiosyncrasies. In this respect, the articulation of the fundamental rights discourse at 
the political level might appear rather schizophrenic, with different forces puling in 
opposite directions. These opposing forces are visible also in the case law of the 
European Court of Justice, albeit, naturally, the centralising force has been 
predominant in the court’s discourse. While this centralisation is fully justified in 
relation to most of the case law, to either ensure the proper functioning of the Union 
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or the protection of individuals, in cases involving a clash of rights, such a 
centralising approach is more debatable. In this case, centralisation is the result of a 
false premise, that of an ontological homogeneity between Treaty rights and 
fundamental rights. This false premise determines both the artificial strengthening of 
some claims vis-a-vis others, solely because of the existence of a cross-border 
element, and also the imposition of the court’s hermeneutic monopoly. Furthermore, 
the fallacious starting point determines the impossibility of ascertaining the reasons 
behind the adjudicating process. However, once the legal discourse is articulated in a 
different way, so that the competing fundamental rights are properly identified, it is 
possible to correct these distortions and to ensure a hermeneutically consistent 
system. And once the competing claims are identified for what they are, and the 
Community interest is properly identified as no more than a public interest, the 
process of adjudication becomes more transparent, as well as being properly relocated 
in the hands of the national judiciary. After all, centralisation is not always the 
answer.  
